



# ELECTIONS BY MAIL

## WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG?



Tells the tabulation software how to count the votes (which bubble belongs to which candidate)	List of voters sent to printing company	Printer delivers to USPS who delivers to voters	Completed ballots returned to county to be counted	Only preventative measure to people submitting ballots which are not their own	Mail in ballots scanned in batched on central count tabulator	Unnecessarily sent to adjudication	Display vote totals early allows bad actors to know how many ballots need to be added to swing a race	Announcing the results
Incorrect	Printing error	Forwarding ballots to undisclosed locations	Drop boxes subject to break-ins	Insufficient training	Insert fraudulent ballots in bulk	Lack of supervision	Over the internet	SOS provides special USB sticks which could contain malicious vote counting program
Assign votes to wrong candidate	Print extra ballots	Delivered to the wrong voter	Transporters could swap or alter ballots	Some counties use machines to verify signatures which can be hacked	Voter's selection can be moved by a program in a split second and be counted for the wrong candidate	Manually flip votes	Only flip of a switch on some systems	Published results are unofficial. Official is what the county has on their records
Altered after election starts	Sell extra ballots	Unsupervised access to ballots	USPS could swap or manipulate ballots	Default signatures can be added to voter's files so there is always a match	Images used for counting, not actual ballots	Rewriting ballots or unchecking selections	Machine algorithms to control counting	Blindly trusting the results are accurate
Controlling races	Print filled out ballots	Undeliverable as addressed	Allows for late ballots to be counted	If rejected by verifier, sent to supervisor to check, who could push them all through as accepted	Off the shelf products used to scan, and in many cases, the scan station uses a laptop with internet capabilities	Bad actor could gain access through internet and alter data or change various things	Auditing methods used not designed to catch fraud or errors, and easy to bypass	Target for bad actors to interfere with results reporting
Not audited	Print signature on ballots	Massive ballot harvesting	Ballot security insufficient	No cameras or observation/supervision	Program in the software could wake up and write a new database, changing the vote record	Program in the software could wake up and write a new database, changing the vote record	Tabulation used the ballot image to count the votes.	Matchbacks not immediately available to public
Override voter's selections	Sell ballot design	Major chain of custody holes and concerns of ballot handling				Lack of auditing information for each modification made	Prone to attacks	
Undetected	Unauditable or doesn't match the list of people who voted							